Abstract-First we revisit three (BGLS, MBGLS and GZZ) verifiably encrypted signature schemes [2], [6], [9] . We find that they are all not strong unforgeable. We remark that the notion of existential unforgeable is not sufficient for fair exchange protocols in most circumstances. So we propose three new (NBGLS, MBGLS and NGZZ) verifiably encrypted signature schemes which are strong unforgeable. Also we reconsider other two (ZSS and CA) verifiably encrypted signature schemes [8] , [11] , we find that they both cannot resist replacing public key attack. So we strongly suggest that strong unforgeable for verifiably encrypted signature be a better notion than existential unforgeable and checking adjudicator knowing its private key is a necessary step for secure verifiably encrypted signature scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Eurocypt 2003, Boneh et al. first proposed a noninteractive verifiably encrypted signature, which is usually used as a building block when constructing optimistic fair exchange, via aggregation of short signatures called BLS scheme [3] based on the bilinear pairing on a gap DiffieHellman group (GDH group) [2] . Later, Hess presented an attack on [2] and extended its security model and give a new provable secure scheme [9] . In Indocrypt 2003, Zhang et al. presented a new verifiably encrypted signature scheme based on their signature scheme [11] . All of the work introduced above are in traditional certificate-based PKI settings, there are also many papers on this topic in the ID-based public key cryptography (ID-PKC). In ICICS 2005, Z. Zhang et al. gave a provably secure optimistic fair exchange protocol based on SOK-IBS [13] . In CIS05 Gu and Zhu proposed an ID-based verifiably encrypted signature scheme [6] and later they proposed another ID-based verifiably encrypted signature schemes in CISC05 [7] . In ICDCIT05 Choudary and Ashutosh proposed a verifiably encrypted signature scheme provable secure without random oracle [8] . In 2006, Zhang and Zou presented a forgery on Gu and Zhu's ID-VESS. In addition, they also proposed a verifiably encrypted signature (VES) scheme the size of which is shorter than that of Gu and Zhu [12] .
We find that the notion of existential unforgeable is not sufficient for fair exchange protocols in most circumstances. So we propose three new (NBGLS, MBGLS and NGZZ) verifiably encrypted signature schemes which are strong unforgeable based on BGLS, MBGLS and GZZ verifiably encrypted signature schemes [2] , [6] , [9] . Also we reconsider other two (ZSS and CA) verifiably encrypted signature schemes [8] , [11] , we find that they both cannot resist replacing public key attack. So we strongly suggest check adjudicator knowing its private key is a necessary step for secure verifiably encrypted signature scheme.
II. STRONG UNFORGEABILITY VS. EXISTENTIAL UNFORGEABILITY FOR VERIFIABLY ENCRYPTED SIGNATURE SCHEME

A. Security notions for Verifiably Encrypted Signature Scheme
Definition 1: According to [2] , a verifiably encrypted signature scheme comprises seven algorithms. Three, KeyGen, Sign, and Verify, are analogous to those in ordinary signature schemes. The others, AdjKeyGen, VESigCreate, VESigVerify, and Adjudicate, provide the verifiably encrypted signature capability. The algorithms are described below. We refer to the trusted third party as the adjudicator.
• KeyGen, Sign, and Verify: As in the standard signature schemes.
• Adjudicator KeyGen: Generate a public-private key pair (AP K, ASK) for the adjudicator.
• VESig Creation: Given a secret key SK, a message M , and an adjudicator's public key AP K, computes (probabilistically) a verifiably encrypted signature w on M .
• VESig Verification: Given a public key P K, a message M , an adjudicator's public key AP K, and a verifiably encrypted signature w, verify that w is a valid verifiably encrypted signature on M under key P K.
• Adjudication: Given an adjudicator's key pair (AP K, ASK), a certified public key PK, and a verifiably encrypted signature w on some message M , extract and output s, an ordinary signature on M under P K.
From now on, we denote verifiably encrypted signature scheme as VESS, and we revisit the security notions for VESS.
Definition 2: Besides the ordinary notions of signature security in the signature component, they define security properties of VESS: validity, existential unforgeability, and opacity.
• Validity: V ESigV erify(M, V ESigCreate(M )) = 1;
V erify(M, Adjudicate(V ESigCreate(M )) = 1.
• Existential Unforgeability:KeyGen
. Adversary has access to a verifiably encrypted signature creation Oracle S and an adjudication Oracle A along with a hash Oracle, its forgery on M is restricted to not previously being queried to either Oracle.
• Opacity:
Adversary has access to a verifiably encrypted signature creation Oracle S and an adjudication Oracle A along with a hash Oracle, its forgery on M is restricted to not previously being queried to adjudication Oracle A .
B. On Existential Unforgeability
Boneh et al. think existential unforgeability is a good security notion for VESS [2] , but we think that's not enough for many applications. Consider this scenario: in a bank's epayment system, one user A pays for another user B's good. B requests A transfer 10000 dollars into his count. And then he gives A the good which worth 10000 dollars. If and only if the forward rounds are completed, the next round begins. A's signature on "Transfer from A's account 10000 dollars to B's account" is a proof for Bank transferring money from A's account to B's account. We use VESS in this scenario. Obviously, Existential Unforgeability is not enough. If one obtains a VESS signature on "Transfer from A's account 10000 dollars to B's account", and he can forge another VESS on the same message, then he can pretend as A! He can get good by transferring A's money to B's account. Such scenarios are very common in applications. So we suggest strong unforgeablity be a proper security notion for VESS.
C. BGLS Scheme and NBGLS Scheme
Now let's revisit the first VESS proposed by Boneh et al based on BLS signature, which we denote as BGLS scheme. Due to the page limitation, we omit the description of BGLS scheme, readers can refer [2] .
And then we give two attacks on this scheme in the strong unforgeable sense.
• Attack ♣: Attacker gets an ordinary signature σ ∈ G, he selects random
The MBGLS scheme proposed in [9] is different from [2] by replacing h = H(M ) as h = H(M, v), so it also suffers from the above two attacks in the strong unforgeable sense.
In order to resist these attacks, we propose a new VESS signature scheme based on BGLS, We denote it as NBGLS. 1) KeyGen, AdjKeyGen: The user chooses a random a ∈ Z Z p and compute v ← g a . The public key is v ∈ G and the secret key is a ∈ Z Z p ; The adjudicator chooses a random b ∈ Z Z p and computes v = g b . The public key is v ∈ G and the secret key is b ∈ Z Z p . The adjudicator chooses another generator t ∈ G, and compute v = t b . (t, v ) are public parameters. 2) Sign,Verify:Same as the original scheme except replac-
Input is the message M ∈ M, the user secret key a ∈ Z Z p and adjudicator's public key v ∈ G.
Output is the VESS signature(u, w) ∈ G × G which is computed as follows. Let h = H(M, v) and check if h = v or h = t. if they do not hold then compute σ = h a , else return "reject". Select random s ∈ Z Z p ,and 
D. GZSS scheme and NGZSS schme
We revisit the VESS scheme in [6] which we denote as GZZ scheme. Due to the page limitation, we omit the description of BGLS scheme, readers can refer [6] .
• Attack ♣: Attacker gets an ordinary signature (U, V ), he selects random r 2 ∈ Z Z p and compute U 2 = r 2 P and V = V + r 2 P a .The forged VESS signature is U 2 , V ) and the system parameters 
So V ESigV erify(M, V ESigCreate(M )) = 1, and
Security Analysis
• Impossible to forging VESS from ordinary signature:
hD ID + r 1 r 2 P a , Obviously, he needs to know r 1 ,which is a DLP problem or a CDH problem.
• Impossible to forging VESS from old VESS signature: Attacker gets
hD ID + r 1 r 2 P a , he also needs to know r 1 ,which is a DLP problem or a CDH problem.
III. ON ADJUDICATOR
In PKC2007, Dodis et al. give a paper on the security of optimistic fair exchange in the multi-user setting [5] , they give examples of secure optimistic fair exchange in the standalone setting which are not secure in the multi-user setting. In CT-RSA2008, Huang et al give another paper on the formal model for multi-user setting security [10] . In this section, we further extend their research. We give examples which are secure in the one-adjudicator setting while in the multiadjudicator setting are no longer secure. We will attack two VESS signatures, one is [11] which we denote as ZSS scheme and the other is [8] which we denote as CA scheme.
A. ZSS Scheme and Attack on It
1) KeyGen,AdjKeyGen : Generate the system params = (G 1 , G 2 ,
e, q, λ, P, H).
Pick random x, x a ∈ Z Z * q , and compute P pub = xP , P pubadv = x a P . The user and the adjudicator's public keys are x, x a . The user and the adjudicator's secret key are x and x a . 2) Sign,Verify: Given a secret key x, and a message m, compute S = ( 1 H(m)+x )P . Given a public key P pub , a message m, and a signature S, verify if e(H(m)P + P pub , S) = e(P, P ). 3) VESigCreate: Given a secret key x ∈ Z Z * q , a message m, and an adjudicator's public key P pubadv , compute v = ( 1 H(m)+x )P pubadv . The verifiably encrypted signature for m is v. 4) VESigVerify: Given a public key P pub , a message m, an adjudicator's public key P pubadv , and a verifiably encrypted signature ν, accept ν if and only if the following equation holds: e(H(m)P + P p ub, S) = e(P, P pubadv ). 5) Adjudicate: Given an adjudicator's public key P pubadv and the corresponding private key x ∈ Z Z * q , a certified public key P pub ,and a verifiably encrypted signature ν on some message m, ensure that the verifiably encrypted signature is valid, then output
And then we give replacing public key attack to this scheme.
• Attack ♠: Suppose real adjudicator's public key is P pubadv , attacker pretends as an adjudicator and publishes his public key as
. Honest user will give his VESS
), the attacker now can extract the ordinary signature as following: He just queries 2ν to the real adjudicator's Adj (.) Oracle and get the ordinary signature.
B. CA Scheme and Attack on It
1) KeyGen,AdjKeyGen : Pick a generator P ∈ G 1 and x, y ∈ Z Z * p randomly, Compute u = xP , v = yP ∈ G 1 and z = e(P, P ) ∈ G 2 . The user's private key is (x, y) and public key is (P, u, v, z) . Similarly, the adjudicator's private key is (x Ad , y Ad ) and public key is (P Ad , u Ad , v Ad , Z Ad ).
2) Sign,Verify: Given a private key (x, y) ∈ Z Z * p and a message m ∈ Z Z * p , pick a random r ∈ Z Z * p and compute ( 1 x+y+mr )P ∈ G 1 . Here, 1 x+y+mr is computed modulo p. In the unlikely event that x + y + mr = 0, we try again with a different r. The signature is (σ, r). Given a public key (P, u, v, z) to the real adjudicator's Adj(.)Oracle and get the ordinary signature.
C. Some Remarks
We must consider replacing public key attack in VESS. How to resist this attack? The adjudicator must prove to the user knowledge of the private key corresponding to his public key. They can run the zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge to achieve this goal, and this will make the VESS very complicated. With the help of Trusted PKG, we can reduce the complexity. In this scenario, the adjudicator just has to prove his knowledge to the PKG instead of proving to every user his knowledge of private key.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we give some considerations on security notions for VESS. We think that existential unforgeability is not a good security notion for VESS, strong unforgeability is more preferable in most applications. The first three schemes BGLS, MBGLS and ZGG are not secure in the strong unforgeable sense. We give attack to the first three schemes and give improved schemes which are strong unforgeable. Actually, we can divide the VESS into two kinds: one kind is just existential unforgeability and the other kind is strong unforgeability. Schemes in [2] , [6] , [9] fall in the first kind and Schemes in [8] , [11] fall in the second kind. But we note that these new schemes are not efficient and signatures are not short, so our further work is finding efficient schemes and short signatures. In section 3 we give another attack(replacing public key attack) to [8] , [11] . So we suggest that checking adjudicator knowing its private key is a necessary step for secure verifiably encrypted signature scheme.
